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CORRUPT INTENTIONS: 
BRIBERY, UNLAWFUL GRATUITY, AND 
HONEST-SERVICES FRAUD 
ALEX STEIN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
This article advances the understanding of bribery and related offenses from 
an economic standpoint.1 Economic theory holds that the legal system should 
impose criminal liability on a person who advances his goals by using force or 
artifice instead of a voluntary exchange. Force and artifice are inherently 
coercive behaviors, unresponsive to the market mechanisms that put exchange 
prices on what people want to achieve. Because market mechanisms cannot 
control such behaviors, the state should step in and impose criminal 
punishments on the perpetrators. These punishments should discourage future 
coercive behavior. Therefore, they ought to be high enough to offset the 
benefits that perpetrators expect to gain from acting coercively against other 
people’s interests.2 
Bribery and related offenses have a uniform structure: A public official 
receives something of value from a private person in exchange for acting or 
promising to act to the private person’s benefit. Any such transaction divides 
between the parties some asset or opportunity belonging to the government. 
The private person derives profit from misappropriating or obliterating the 
government’s interest and gives part of this profit to the public official. Any 
such transaction is necessarily coercive toward the government. For, as a 
consequence of the official’s betrayal, the government suffers a deprivation of 
its interest, asset, or opportunity. Both parties to this transaction gain from 
bypassing the market. Each of them generates an off-market benefit not 
obtainable through voluntary exchange and the system of rules governing that 
exchange.3 Presence of this two-sided off-market benefit separates bribery and 
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 1.  For an outstanding analysis of bribery from a moral point of view, see Stuart P. Green, What’s 
Wrong with Bribery, in DEFINING CRIMES: ESSAYS ON THE SPECIAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
143, 151–64 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2005) (using moral culpability criteria to explain 
elements of bribery offense).  
 2.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 273–78 (8th ed. 2011). 
 3.  In this article, “market” and “voluntary exchange” have broad meanings. These concepts refer 
not only to business transactions, but also to people’s social organization and functioning through 
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related offenses from noncriminal transactions and, in particular, from 
noncriminal—but still unethical—violations of the various conflict-of-interest 
rules. 
This market-focused criterion helps identify evidence that conclusively 
establishes the mens rea and the actus reus for bribery and related offenses. 
This criterion also helps identify the proper scope of the honest-services fraud 
offense. In two precedential decisions, Sun-Diamond4 and Skilling,5 the 
Supreme Court has narrowed the government’s ability to prosecute individuals 
for those offenses. In Sun-Diamond, it held that proof of bribery and unlawful 
gratuity incorporates the government’s duty to identify the specific official act 
for which the bribe or gratuity was given.6 In Skilling, the Court decided that 
presence of a bribe or a kickback payment is one of the elements of honest-
services fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1346.7 This interpretation created an overlap 
between bribery and unlawful gratuity on the one hand, and honest-services 
fraud on the other.8 By creating this overlap, the Court introduced the stringent 
requirement for establishing mens rea, set up in Sun-Diamond, into the 
definition of honest-services fraud. 
These narrow interpretations of core corruption offenses have removed the 
threat of criminal responsibility from a wide variety of off-market transactions 
that benefit public officials and private individuals at the government’s expense. 
By adopting these interpretations, the Court undercut Congress’s anti-
 
democratic institutions.  
 4.  United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999).  
 5.  Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
 6.  Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404–14. 
 7.  Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2925–31. 
 8.  The elements of bribery, on the one hand, and unlawful gratuity, on the other hand, are 
succinctly described by Justice Scalia in Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404: 
The first crime, described in § 201(b)(1) as to the giver, and § 201(b)(2) as to the recipient, is 
bribery, which requires a showing that something of value was corruptly given, offered, or 
promised to a public official (as to the giver) or corruptly demanded, sought, received, 
accepted, or agreed to be received or accepted by a public official (as to the recipient) with 
intent, inter alia, “to influence any official act” (giver) or in return for “being influenced in the 
performance of any official act” (recipient). The second crime, defined in § 201(c)(1)(A) as to 
the giver, and in § 201(c)(1)(B) as to the recipient, is illegal gratuity, which requires a showing 
that something of value was given, offered, or promised to a public official (as to the giver), or 
demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to be received or accepted by a public 
official (as to the recipient), “for or because of any official act performed or to be performed 
by such public official.” 
The key difference between these two crimes, in Justice Scalia’s words, is as follows:  
Bribery requires intent “to influence” an official act or “to be influenced” in an official act, 
while illegal gratuity requires only that the gratuity be given or accepted “for or because of” 
an official act . . . . An illegal gratuity . . . may constitute merely a reward for some future act 
that the public official will take (and may already have determined to take), or for a past act 
that he has already taken.  
Id. at 404–05. 
  The statutory prohibition of honest-services fraud is much broader than these two 
offences: it criminalizes and punishes any “scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible 
right of honest services.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006). 
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corruption policies and weakened the deterrence against corruption. Under my 
“two-sided off-market benefit” criterion for identifying criminal corruption, 
these interpretations are economically misguided and therefore wrong. 
This article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I carry out an economic analysis 
of bribery and related offenses and identify their common characteristic: 
presence of an off-market benefit on both sides of the illicit transaction. In Parts 
III and IV, respectively, I use this analysis to demonstrate that the Supreme 
Court’s precedential decisions in Sun-Diamond and Skilling are mistaken. A 
short conclusion follows. 
II 
THE ECONOMICS OF BRIBERY 
The economic approach to law calls for an imposition of criminal liability 
upon people who act coercively, and only upon those people. As I indicated at 
the outset, a person acts coercively when he bypasses the market by using force 
or artifice, instead of a voluntary exchange, as a means for promoting his goals.9 
Market bypass is the main economic reason for holding a person liable 
criminally, rather than civilly, in cases in which he behaves in a socially harmful 
way. This reason works particularly well with bribery and related offenses 
because bribery is an economically driven, market-bypassing transaction by 
design. 
Bribery encompasses three types of illicit deal: proprietary, bureaucratic, 
and letting-off.10 Proprietary bribery features a government’s agent who grants a 
governmental contract or franchise to a person (or firm) and receives money or 
its equivalent in return.11 The briber bypasses the competition with other 
bidders and obtains from the agent a favorable off-market deal with the 
government. The agent thus helps the briber to steal from the government in 
exchange for money or its equivalent. 
Bureaucratic bribery involves no theft. Instead, it expedites the briber’s 
acquisition of an official permit, license, or document.12 The briber can obtain 
the required permit, license, or document lawfully by following certain 
procedures or by waiting in the applicants’ queue. The briber, however, chooses 
to act unlawfully: He pays the government’s agent for the red tape’s removal or 
for bypassing the queue. 
In this scenario, no one may actually get hurt. The agent does not give the 
briber a permit, a license, or a document that the briber was not supposed to 
receive from the government. Law-abiding citizens queuing for the 
 
 9.  See POSNER, supra note 2, at 273–78. 
 10.  For an economic analysis of the first two types of bribery, see generally Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. ECON. 599 (1993). For an economic analysis of the third type 
of bribery, as contrasted with extortion, see generally Fahad Khalil et al., Bribery Versus Extortion: 
Allowing the Lesser of Two Evils, 41 RAND J. ECON. 179 (2010).  
 11.  See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 10, at 601–02.  
 12.  Id. 
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government’s permits, licenses, and documents endure no delays either (this 
will not always be the case: I make this assumption for the sake of clarity). 
Under the bureaucratic bribery scenario, the agent issues their permits, licenses, 
and documents properly and at a scheduled time. At the same time, he 
introduces a private improvement in the functioning of the government’s 
agency by making it more productive. Ideally, of course, it is the government 
that should make such improvements, but the government does not know it can 
improve the agency’s productivity (or does not care about improving the 
agency’s work). The agent exploits the government’s ignorance (or 
indifference) by introducing the improvement privately at the briber’s expense, 
while capturing its economic value (the bribe). 
The third and final variant of bribery is letting-off—a deal involving a law-
enforcement agent who allows his briber to break the law and go unpunished 
(after paying the agent).13 When the agent sabotages the government’s 
enforcement effort, the government suffers a tangible deprivation. The briber’s 
deal with the agent consequently becomes similar to proprietary bribery. The 
government’s enforcement and deterrent capacity, however, will not always be 
eroded as a consequence of such a deal. Consider a government that rations its 
enforcement effort by requiring its agents to enforce the law against eighty 
percent of the violators. The agent collects bribes from twenty randomly chosen 
violators out of one hundred and lets them off, while meticulously enforcing the 
law against the remaining eighty violators. In this scenario, the government gets 
what it pays the agent for, while the agent delivers on his undertaking to the 
government. Moreover, twenty violators that the government was ready to let 
off completely are now paying a private “violation tax” to the agent. As a result, 
violators are better deterred overall than under the government’s plan. 
To illustrate, assume that the twenty bribers pay the agent $100 each, while 
each of the remaining eighty violators pays the government a $150 fine. The 
violators thus pay collectively $14,000 for their misdeeds, as opposed to the 
$12,000 that they would have paid under the government’s plan. The collection 
of an additional $2000 from the violators shows that the government’s 
enforcement method was suboptimal. Under perfect information, the 
government would have set the fine at $140 and required the agent to enforce 
the law against every violator. The government was unaware of this possible 
improvement because the agent did not reveal that he could be more 
productive in enforcing the law. Instead of revealing this information to the 
government, he improved the violators’ deterrence privately in order to benefit 
himself. The agent’s action thus constitutes a mirror image of bureaucratic 
bribery. In the bureaucratic bribery scenario, the agent is paid privately for 
improving the functioning of the government’s agency. Here, he is paid 
privately for not making the required improvement. 
Understanding these different forms of bribery is crucial for the economic 
 
 13.  This type of bribery is discussed in Khalil et al., supra note 10, at 179–82 (focusing on bribery 
by enforcement officers, also capable of extorting payments from private citizens). 
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analysis of anti-corruption laws. This understanding can also facilitate 
normative inquiries into the requisite mens rea standards. Each form of bribery 
is an off-market contract incorporating the parties’ motives and intentions. The 
contract does not state those motives and intentions publicly because they are 
unlawful and the parties consequently try to conceal them. Courts, however, 
can ascertain those motives and intentions by juxtaposing the parties’ exchange 
against the market. When the exchange aligns with transactions available on the 
open market, it does not constitute bribery (nor is it normally intended to form 
a bribery deal). Conversely, when the exchange bypasses the market and yields 
off-market gains to both the payer and the official, the requisite intent to give 
and accept a bribe will be present and bribery will be established. The purpose 
of this test is to separate coercive behavior that should be criminalized from the 
market behavior that should not, and I will say more about it later in this article. 
Bribery always generates an off-market gain for both parties at the 
government’s expense. As a consequence of any such deal, the government 
suffers a proprietary deprivation or is denied its agent’s good service (for which 
it both paid the agent and sacrificed the opportunity to hire a better agent). The 
government did not authorize any such deal. The briber and the agent therefore 
acted coercively, and hence criminally, against the government’s interest. The 
economic value of the entitlement stolen from the government determines the 
off-market gain that the parties—the briber and the agent—split among 
themselves. This ill-gotten gain determines the total “quid pro quo” amount 
upon which courts should focus in adjudicating bribery cases. Courts should 
focus on this gain alone because transactions generating no off-market gains for 
both parties do not constitute bribery or unlawful gratuity. 
Consider a government’s agent who has an obligation to issue a passport to 
a citizen. The agent lets the citizen understand that he will issue the passport 
only if the citizen pays him $100. The citizen pays the agent $100 and receives 
the passport. Under this set of facts, the agent is guilty of extortion14 while the 
citizen—the extortion’s victim—is completely innocent. Neither party is guilty 
of bribery. The reason is simple: The government (unlike the extorted citizen) 
had suffered no coercive deprivation. The citizen received her passport from 
the government, but she was entitled to receive it from the beginning. 
Importantly, the citizen did not try to expedite the issuance of her passport by 
paying $100 to the agent. She paid the agent $100 to remove his threat not to 
issue the passport. The citizen consequently did not obtain any off-market 
advantage for herself. Her benefit from the deal with the agent—the passport—
was available on the marketplace in which citizens openly deal with the 
 
 14.  See Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 537 U.S. 393, 402 (2003) (describing the common-law 
crime of extortion as “a property offense committed by a public official who took ‘any money or thing 
of value’ that was not due to him under the pretense that he was entitled to such property by virtue of 
his office,” while adding that modern legislation, both state and federal, has expanded the definition of 
that crime to include acts by private individuals); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2006) (the “Hobbs 
Act”) (“The term ‘extortion’ means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced 
by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”). 
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government. This marketplace is the passport agency and its rules, set up by the 
citizens through their democracy mechanism. Moreover, the citizen would not 
be guilty of attempted bribery even if she offered the agent $100 on the false 
belief that this is her only way to obtain the passport. Under this scenario, the 
citizen will be acting under an erroneous assumption that she is being 
extorted—a mistake that does not turn her into a briber. The citizen could only 
be guilty of bribery if she paid the agent $100 for expediting the passport’s 
issuance.15 This transaction would generate an off-market benefit for each party. 
This analytical framework turns the mental-element requirement for bribery 
and related offenses into an issue of contract interpretation. Every bribery 
deal—proprietary, bureaucratic, and letting-off—incorporates an off-market 
exchange that the parties intend to accomplish. This exchange can be specified 
and unconditional: The briber may pay the official for a specific action or 
decision that promotes the briber’s interest. The exchange can also be specified 
but conditional: The briber may pay the official for a favorable action (or 
decision) that the official will only take (or make) should an appropriate 
opportunity present itself. Finally, the exchange can be completely unspecified: 
The briber may pay the official for maintaining a favorable disposition or 
goodwill towards the briber. This disposition means that the official will, or 
might, help the briber at some point down the road, but only if an appropriate 
opportunity presents itself and without making any definite promise for help. 
The first type of exchange replicates a regular contract, while the second has 
the structure of a conditional agreement. The third type of exchange follows the 
path of an underspecified relational contract.16 Correspondingly, in the first type 
of exchange, the parties form an unconditional intent to give and accept a bribe, 
whereas in the second, the parties’ intent to give and accept a bribe is 
conditional. The third type of exchange is different from the previous two in 
that it only sets up a general bonding relationship between the parties. Under a 
legitimate relational contract, this relationship requires parties to act in good 
faith and to mutually promote each other’s interests in all situations not 
expressly regulated by the contract. Here, this relationship establishes 
favoritism: The briber pays the official to make him favorably disposed towards 
 
 15.  The citizen also might be guilty of attempted bribery if she offered the agent $100 for the 
passport on the mistaken belief that the agent has the power to deny her application. Her bribery 
attempt would have been impossible, but likely punishable under the “objective act” test that courts 
use to separate factually impossible, and hence punishable, attempts from attempts that are legally 
impossible and not punishable. The citizen’s objective act could have accomplished bribery if the 
circumstances of the case were as she believed them to be. See Peter Westen, Impossibility Attempts: A 
Speculative Thesis, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 537–42 (2008) (explaining the “objective act” test and 
attesting that several federal courts use it). But see People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169, 170 (N.Y. 1906) 
(exonerating defendant who accepted an undercover police informant’s proposal to buy stolen cloth as 
the cloth’s owners allowed police to offer it for sale in a sting operation); R v. Taaffe, [1984] A.C. 539 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (exonerating defendant who smuggled a package containing cannabis 
under the mistaken belief that he participates in an illegal importation of foreign currency into Great 
Britain). 
 16.  See generally Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 877 (2000). 
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the briber, and the official accepts the payment to create this disposition. The 
official’s disposition is neither a promise nor an undertaking, but it does 
motivate the official to promote the briber’s interests at the government’s 
expense. Therefore, technically, the payment (or its equivalent) that the official 
receives from the briber is not a “bribe.” For it does not induce the official to 
take any specific action in the briber’s favor. The payment, however, turns the 
briber into the official’s favorite and, therefore, constitutes an unlawful gratuity 
(or honest-services fraud17). 
Conditional intent to commit a crime is generally as bad and as punishable 
as an unconditional one.18 The mens rea accompanying regular and conditional 
bribery is therefore relatively easy to ascertain. When the payer and the official 
strike a mutually beneficial deal not available on the open market, their deal 
constitutes bribery (whether conditional or unconditional). The parties’ 
exchange of the off-market benefits—the private benefit to the official and the 
governmental benefit to the payer—can never be accidental. Hence, it is 
intentional, and the court need not carry out any further investigation into the 
parties’ motivations. 
The same market analysis applies to non-token gratuities. When the gratuity 
the official receives from the payer does not fall within the scope of the regular 
market exchange, it establishes favoritism—a bond the official and the payer 
are not supposed to form. As in core bribery cases, the parties’ exchange reveals 
their economic goals: The payer gives the official a pecuniary benefit to make 
the official favorably disposed towards his interests, and the official accepts the 
benefit—because he wants it—and forms the disposition that the payer expects 
him to form. This economic consequence cannot be accidental and, therefore, 
establishes the parties’ intents. There is no reason to believe that payers and 
officials strike favoritism deals innocently without intending to create 
favoritism. Unlawful gratuity can thus be perceived an inchoate, or preparatory, 
variant of bribery—a smaller, less serious “sister offense.”19 
From an economic standpoint, this market-focused approach is superior to 
every other approach. The criminal law’s mens rea requirement promotes two 
economic goals. First, it helps identify coercive transgressors who bypass the 
market with the help of force or artifice, instead of transacting with the relevant 
actors voluntarily.20 Because a person cannot bypass the market accidentally, 
without being aware of his conduct’s nature and likely consequences, 
economically minded scholars believe that criminal liability cannot be imposed 
upon people who acted without intent, knowledge, or awareness. Second, and 
equally important, the mens rea requirement reduces individuals’ cost of 
 
 17.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) (defining honest-services fraud as any “scheme or artifice to 
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services”).  
 18.  For general analysis of conditional intent, see Gideon Yaffe, Conditional Intent and Mens Rea, 
10 LEGAL THEORY 273 (2004).  
 19.  See United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 152 (2d Cir. 2007) (contrasting unlawful gratuity and 
bribery while calling the former a “lesser included offense”). 
 20.  See POSNER, supra note 2, at 294–95. 
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obtaining information concerning the circumstances and probable consequences 
of their actions.21 Because a person cannot be held criminally responsible for 
matters outside his knowledge, he need not investigate facts and possibilities of 
which he is not aware. The person’s assurance that he can act upon his 
knowledge makes it easy and, consequently, relatively cheap for him to avoid 
criminal liability.22 Removal of this assurance would result in a socially 
deleterious chilling effect: The person would find it difficult to satisfy the 
demands of criminal law, and the ensuing fear of punishment would motivate 
him to steer away from activities that might benefit society. 
The market approach to mens rea for bribery promotes these goals. This 
approach gives courts a handy toolset for identifying bribery and its underlying 
motivations. Under this approach, any off-market exchange between the 
government’s agent and a private person will constitute bribery when it yields 
both parties a benefit. The parties’ revealed motivation—mutual enrichment at 
the government’s expense—will establish their intent to bypass the market in 
every individual case. This motivation will suffice even when the parties’ quid-
pro-quo arrangement is not completely specified. 
Adoption of this market-focused approach will exert no chilling effects on 
socially beneficial activities. Under this approach, the government’s agents and 
the individuals they deal with will have a safe harbor—the open market, which 
they should never bypass. Aligning their transactions with the market will allow 
the parties to avoid criminal liability for bribery and related offenses. To secure 
the required alignment, public officials and the individuals they deal with only 
need to be familiar with the market within which they operate and with the 
market’s rules. 
This familiarity is easy to acquire and it will likely be present in virtually 
every case. Public officials and private-sector entrepreneurs know exactly when 
they carry out a regular business transaction and when they bypass the market 
by forming a mutually beneficial deal. These professionals are also well aware 
of the relevant contractual and other legal entitlements—both tangible and 
intangible—that they undertake to respect. The market benchmark is also 
robust enough to enable courts and prosecutors to distinguish between bribery 
(and related offenses) and legitimate business. This benchmark will also prompt 
courts to rely on the economic preferences manifested by relevant transactions 
and to steer away from “noise” (the parties’ and other witnesses’ reconstructive 
narratives). 
As a concrete example, consider a law firm that provides a discounted legal 
service to a senior public official. The firm gives the official this discount in 
order to advance its reputation. Having the official in the firm’s portfolio of 
clients communicates to potential clients that the firm does high quality work. 
For the firm, the market value of this signal is greater than the discount it gives 
 
 21.  See generally Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741 (1993). 
 22.  Id. at 769–77. 
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the official. For his part, the official obtains the discount by taking advantage of 
his reputational value to the firm. This transaction may be ethically 
questionable. It might be unethical for a public official to cash his reputational 
value in this way. The focus here is on criminal law, however—not on ethics. 
Therefore, the ethical issue merits no further discussion. As far as criminal law 
is concerned, the exchange between the official and the firm squarely aligns 
with the market. Consequently, the “two-sided off-market benefit” criterion 
rules out the possibility of convicting one of the parties of bribery, unlawful 
gratuity, or honest-services fraud.23 
Things could be different if the parties’ exchange were to include an implicit 
understanding that the official will use his authority to promote the interests of 
the firm or any of its clients. Under this scenario, part of the discount the 
official receives from the firm—if not the entire discount amount—would 
constitute an off-market benefit. The firm’s position as the holder of the 
official’s express or implicit promise of help would constitute an off-market 
benefit as well. The parties’ exchange would consequently qualify as a 
corruption offense: bribery, unlawful gratuity, or honest-services fraud—
depending upon the nature of the official’s promise of help and the strength of 
the nexus between that promise and the discount. 
Arguably, prosecutors would find it difficult to differentiate between the 
two types of exchange because parties will always claim their exchange to be 
innocent. This projection is overstated. The prosecution would always be able 
to juxtapose the parties’ exchange against the rates the relevant market has 
established for similar transactions.24 This juxtaposition is more promising than 
reliance on the parties’ and other witnesses’ narratives. When the parties’ 
 
 23.  See Kathleen Clark, Paying the Price for Heightened Ethics Scrutiny: Legal Defense Funds and 
Other Ways that Government Officials Pay Their Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 65, 112–13 (1997) 
(criticizing the Justice Department’s censure of the discounts law firms gave to public officials, and 
observing, “[f]irst, these donating lawyers may be motivated by a desire to work on interesting, high-
profile cases that may garner them publicity. Second, they may see such work as within their pro bono 
mission—an obligation to do work in the public interest regardless of a client’s ability to pay. Third, a 
law firm’s decision to provide discounted legal services may be no different from the decision of a 
rental car agency or an airline to provide government employees with a discount on their regular 
rates”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 24.  See United States v. Townsend, 630 F.3d 1003, 1011–12 (11th Cir. 2011) (relying on market to 
determine whether improved bail conditions obtained by defendant by bribing his supervising officer 
had a $5000 or greater value for purposes of the $5000 threshold that established federal jurisdiction); 
United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 266–70 (3d Cir. 2007) (attesting that loans below market value 
received by public official from a bank constitute bribery and honest-services frauds); United States v. 
Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1191–94 (5th Cir. 1996) (relying on market to determine, for purposes of the 
$5000 federal-jurisdiction threshold, the value of unauthorized conjugal visits with a prisoner’s wife and 
mistress that the prisoner obtained by bribing a sheriff and his deputy); Klaczak v. Consol. Med. 
Transp., 458 F. Supp. 2d 622, 639–61 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (determining value of a kickback by reference to 
market value for ambulance transports); United States v. McLaren Reg’l Med. Ctr., 202 F. Supp. 2d 
671, 674–78 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (determining value of kickbacks by reference to market rental value of 
real estate); United States v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1107 (D. Kan 1999) (“Only the difference 
between the fair market value and the proposed purchase price would be considered the solicitation of 
a bribe.”).  
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exchange is off-market and when they have—or anticipate having—a business 
relationship besides the official’s representation by the firm, the prosecution 
will find it easy to establish the presence of criminal corruption. Absent such 
evidence, charges of corruption will be unfounded.25 Similarly, no prosecution 
for bribery should be initiated when the parties’ transaction constitutes a 
voluntary market-based exchange.26 
With this in mind, I now turn to discuss the Supreme Court’s interpretations 
of three corruption offenses: bribery, unlawful gratuity, and honest-services 
fraud. 
III 
SUN-DIAMOND REVISITED 
The Supreme Court began its precedential decision in Sun-Diamond by 
observing that the divine punishment for corruption is economically inefficient. 
“Talmudic sages”—wrote Justice Scalia for the unanimous court— 
believed that judges who accepted bribes would be punished by eventually losing all 
knowledge of the divine law, [while the] Federal Government, dealing with many 
public officials who are not judges, and with at least some judges for whom this 
sanction holds no terror, has constructed a framework of human laws . . . defining 
various sorts of impermissible gifts, and punishing those who give or receive them with 
administrative sanctions, fines, and incarceration.
27
 
This observation created an anticipation that the Court would move on to 
fix the deterrence shortfall by giving more power to the human anticorruption 
laws. This anticipation was only momentary, however, as the Court quickly 
made it clear that it would not expand the scope of bribery and unlawful 
gratuity prohibitions. In fact, the Court’s decision took the federal anti-bribery 
 
 25.  A point of disclosure: this example reflects the opinion I gave as a consultant in a bribery case. 
 26.  Such prosecutions would also be unfounded in relation to corrupt markets where bribery 
functions as a social norm. In those markets, government agents are guilty of extortion, but private 
people who “bribe” those agents cannot be considered criminally corrupt because they buy themselves 
no advantage over other bribers. This point resonates with a story about a judge in a developing 
country who made the following announcement to the plaintiff and the defendant: “Because each of 
you paid me the same amount, I am going to decide this case according to law.” For an American-law 
example that borderlines with the “everyone is doing it” defense, see United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 
730, 735 (4th Cir. 1976). This decision discusses what then appeared to be a norm among bankers: using 
the bank’s money to make political contributions in order to bond with the politicians. According to the 
court, such “goodwill” expenditures are not bribery when the donor merely aims to create a “favorable 
business climate.” Specifically, the Fourth Circuit decided that 
the crucial distinction between ‘goodwill’ expenditures and bribery is, then, the existence or 
nonexistence of criminal intent that the benefit be received by the official as a quid pro quo 
for some official act, pattern of acts, or agreement to act favorably to the donor when 
necessary. . . . If ‘influence’ is given its broadest common meaning, it is clear that ‘goodwill’ 
gifts and favors to and entertainment of government officials are intended to influence the 
judgment of such officials. That is, such expenditures are made with the hope that the officials 
will be more likely to award government business to the donor if a favorable business climate 
is created than if such a climate is not established. But . . . this type of influence does not 
amount to bribery.  
Id. 
 27.  United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 400 (1999).  
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statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, in the opposite direction. 
Facts upon which this decision was made are remarkable. The defendant, 
Sun-Diamond, was an agricultural trade association representing about 5000 
farmers. These farmers were interested in the government’s doing and not 
doing certain things related to their business. The farmers wanted the 
Department of Agriculture (DOA) to give them grants for promoting sales of 
farm commodities in foreign countries. They did not want the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to ban their cheap pesticide—methyl bromide. And 
they also did not want this agency to fund the search for the pesticide’s 
substitutes. Correspondingly, they wanted the DOA to block the EPA’s 
initiative. 
Because both governmental departments—DOA and EPA—were supposed 
to promote public good that did not necessarily align with the farmers’ interests, 
Sun-Diamond made a special effort to create the alignment. As part of this 
effort, it befriended the Agriculture Secretary, Mr. Michael Espy. The bonding 
between the two sides to this new friendship included gifts that Sun-Diamond 
gave to Mr. Espy, which he graciously accepted. These gifts included tickets to 
the 1993 U.S. Open Tennis Tournament in the amount of $2295; luggage worth 
$2427; meals worth $665; and, finally, a framed print and crystal bowl purchased 
at $524. The gifts’ total cost was $5900 (in 1993). For his part, Mr. Espy did 
nothing to benefit the farmers represented by Sun-Diamond, nor did he give 
them any explicit or implied promise to help. 
The government argued that this evidence established that Sun-Diamond 
gave Mr. Espy an unlawful gratuity and, thus, perpetrated a crime under section 
201(c)(1)(A), a statute that prohibits giving “anything of value” to a public 
official “for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such 
public official.”28 Sun-Diamond strenuously disagreed. Though admitting it gave 
the aforementioned gifts to Mr. Espy, who was at the time the Agriculture 
Secretary, and that the gifts were “of value,” Sun-Diamond claimed it was not 
guilty of the alleged crime. 
How come? According to Sun-Diamond, the reason was simple: It gave 
those gifts to Mr. Espy neither “for” nor “because” of any specific “official act” 
that he performed or was supposed to perform. 
The District Court accepted the government’s position that 
under the gratuity statute, it is not necessary for the indictment to allege a direct nexus 
between the value conferred to Secretary Espy by Sun-Diamond and an official act 
performed or to be performed by Secretary Espy. It is sufficient for the indictment to 
allege that Sun-Diamond provided things of value to Secretary Espy because of his 
position.
29
 
After trial, the court gave the jury a similar instruction about the applicable 
law and the jury found Sun-Diamond guilty as charged.30 The Court of Appeals 
 
 28.  18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 29.  941 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (D.D.C. 1996).  
 30.  Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 403. 
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reversed this conviction and remanded the case for a new trial after finding that 
the District Court’s instruction “invited the jury to convict on materially less 
evidence than the statute demands—evidence of gifts driven simply by Espy’s 
official position.”31 The Court of Appeals, however, also rejected Sun-
Diamond’s claim that the government needs to prove that a gratuity was given 
“for or because of” a particular official act.32 According to the Court of Appeals, 
the government will satisfy its burden by proving the giver’s “intent to reward 
past favorable acts or to make future ones more likely.”33 Under this definition 
of the requisite mens rea, the government had enough evidence to move its case 
to the jury. 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Supreme Court, disagreed with this ruling. 
According to him, the “official act” element is “pregnant with the requirement 
that some particular official act be identified and proved.”34 Otherwise, held 
Justice Scalia, section 201(c)(1)(A)  
would criminalize, for example, token gifts to the President based on his official 
position and not linked to any identifiable act—such as the replica jerseys given by 
championship sports teams each year during ceremonial White House visits [and a] 
high school principal’s gift of a school baseball cap to the Secretary of Education, by 
reason of his office, on the occasion of the latter’s visit to the school.
35
  
For Justice Scalia, these patently unacceptable consequences call for 
interpreting the unlawful-gratuity prohibition narrowly. 
Justice Scalia alluded to these consequences as a supplementary, rather than 
a main, reason for interpreting section 201(c)(1)(A) as he did. His main reasons 
relied on two canons of statutory interpretation.36 First, criminal prohibitions 
should generally be given a narrow meaning that favors freedom over 
unfreedom.37 Hence, it is up to Congress to adopt “a broadly prophylactic 
criminal prohibition upon gift giving” if it really prefers such a broad 
prohibition.38 Second, to avoid overcriminalization and excessive punishment, 
criminal prohibitions should be understood as part of the legal system’s 
regulatory mechanism as a whole.39 From this perspective, “a narrow, rather 
than a sweeping, prohibition is more compatible with the fact that § 
201(c)(1)(A) is merely one strand of an intricate web of regulations, both 
administrative and criminal, governing the acceptance of gifts and other self-
enriching actions by public officials.”40 “[C]riminal statutes”—as Justice Scalia 
explained—“are merely the tip of the regulatory iceberg” that includes an 
 
 31.  138 F.3d 961, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 969. 
 34.  Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 406. 
 35.  Id. at 406–07. 
 36.  Id. at 408–09. 
 37.  See Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2422–23 (2006) (describing rule of 
lenity).  
 38.  Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 408. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 409. 
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administrative prohibition for any “employee of the executive, legislative, or 
judicial branch [to] . . . accept anything of value from a person . . . whose 
interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance 
of the individual’s official duties.”41 Based on these reasons, Justice Scalia 
concluded that, “in order to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), 
the Government must prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a 
public official and a specific ‘official act’ for or because of which it was given.”42 
This decision suffers from a number of flaws. The first flaw is 
miscategorization. For a reason that Justice Scalia did not articulate, his 
decision brings the applicable evidentiary and substantive criminal law 
requirements under a single roof of section 201(c)(1)(A). This interpretive 
move is mystifying. Most criminal prohibitions, to use Justice Scalia’s language, 
are not pregnant with evidentiary requirements, and section 201(c)(1)(A) does 
not appear to be exceptional. The provisions of this section do not say anything 
about evidence. They are strictly about substantive criminal law—specifically, 
the definition of the “unlawful gratuity” offense. Under this definition, a person 
commits the offense when he gives a public official “anything of value . . . for or 
because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public 
official.”43 How to prove that the person gave the official a gift “for or because 
of any official act performed or to be performed by” that official is a separate 
matter—one addressed by the law of evidence. Specifically, evidence law 
provides that the prosecution can prove a defendant’s guilt by any admissible 
evidence that the jury finds credible “beyond a reasonable doubt.”44 There are 
crimes in relation to which the law sets some additional evidentiary 
requirements for convicting a person,45 but section 201(c)(1)(A) is not one of 
them. 
Furthermore, granted that writing a special evidentiary requirement into 
section 201(c)(1)(A) would somehow be a good idea, why require the 
government to prove unlawful-gratuity accusations by evidence that identifies 
“a link between [the gift] and a specific ‘official act’”?46 Why not follow the 
general evidence law that affords the government flexibility in proving 
defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Specifically, why prefer direct 
evidence to circumstantial? As virtually all evidence specialists will confirm, 
circumstantial evidence is as good as direct evidence—among other things, 
because “circumstances cannot lie.”47 
 
 41.  Id. at 410 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7353(a)(2) (2006)). 
 42.  Id. at 414. 
 43.  18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). Although Congress did not italicize the 
word “any,” doing so might have been a good idea. 
 44.  See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 172–83 (2005) (explaining the “proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement). This requirement is mandated by the Constitution. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).  
 45.  For examples, see STEIN, supra note 44, at 18–25.  
 46.  Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 414. 
 47.  See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE: 
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The principle “circumstances cannot lie” also applies to the economics of 
transactions. People sometimes lie about the nature of their transactions, but 
the economics underlying those transactions always reveal their true nature. 
The gift transaction between Sun-Diamond and Secretary Espy is no exception. 
This transaction had established a bonding relationship between the two 
parties—in simple terms, favoritism. This relationship followed the format of an 
under-specified relational agreement.48 Sun-Diamond gave Mr. Espy gifts to 
make him favorably disposed toward the affiliated farmers’ interests, and Mr. 
Espy accepted these gifts to create this disposition. This disposition included the 
Secretary’s implicit, indefinite, and unspecified promise to help the farmers 
when it became possible and convenient. That this promise was implicit, 
indefinite, and unspecified does not make the promise inconsequential. The 
promise had economic value, and this value was far from trivial. Hence, the 
Secretary received Sun-Diamond’s gifts “for or because of any official act” that 
he might perform in the future.49 
Justice Scalia’s decision defies this economic logic. This defiance is 
unjustified. It breaks away from another canonical principle, popularized by 
Justice Scalia’s former colleague at the University of Chicago. As Milton 
Friedman famously observed, “There’s no such thing as a free lunch.”50 By the 
same token, and contrary to Justice Scalia’s decision, there are also no such 
things as free tickets to a U.S. Open Tennis Tournament, free luggage, free 
meals, and a free crystal bowl.51 Application of the “off-market exchange” 
criterion easily verifies this observation (if it still requires verification). Under 
this criterion, an exchange between a private citizen and a public official 
constitutes bribery or unlawful gratuity whenever it yields both parties benefits 
not available on the market. The market, as we know it, does not offer for free 
any of the valuables Sun-Diamond gave to Secretary Espy, nor does it freely 
distribute favoritism agreements with the government’s agents. Sun-Diamond’s 
gifts induced Mr. Espy to help the affiliated farmers at society’s expense. As 
such, they constituted an unlawful gratuity under section 201(c)(1)(A). Justice 
Scalia’s concern about potential criminalization of token gifts is exaggerated. To 
the best of my knowledge, no person has ever been prosecuted for (let alone 
convicted of) corruption based on her giving or receiving a jersey, a T-shirt, a 
baseball cap, or other memorabilia. Similarly, no person has ever been 
 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 217 (1991) (attesting that 
the maxim “circumstances cannot lie” had become commonplace already in the Eighteenth Century). 
 48. Compare again the structure of this agreement with the features of relational contracts laid out 
in Macneil, supra note 16.  
 49.  18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 50.  MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH (1977).  
 51.  Cf. United States v. Williams, 7 F. Supp. 2d 40, 43 (D.D.C. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss 
indictment against lobbyist for Tyson Foods company, who gave Secretary Espy “seats to the 1993 
Presidential inaugural gala, travel and lodging connected with a Tyson birthday party . . . travel, lodging 
and tickets to a National Football Conference playoff game . . . , a Tyson foundation scholarship for the 
Secretary’s girlfriend, and, for the Acting Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, a $13 basketball ticket and 
a first-class upgrade coupon for an airplane flight”). 
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prosecuted for providing a government’s visitor lunch or dinner. (And, 
conversely, no public official has ever been prosecuted for eating lunch or 
dinner while visiting a private firm or institution.) American prosecutors, 
judges, and juries possess enough common sense and good will to avert such 
absurdities. 
The off-market exchange criterion sets up an even better safety barrier 
against such absurd prosecutions. Virtually all memorabilia gifts are open-
market transactions following a uniform pattern. The public official acquires no 
pecuniary benefit from receiving a memorabilia gift. And neither does the gift’s 
giver acquire any business advantage for himself—besides the enhancement of 
visibility and reputation from the official’s holding or wearing of the gift. This 
benefit may have substantial economic value, but it induces no official action on 
the part of the official and hence does not constitute a bribe or unlawful 
gratuity. More crucially, a memorabilia gift creates no exclusivity in the parties’ 
relationship because the official can—and, in all likelihood, will—receive 
similar gifts from others. The gift, therefore, does not affect the official’s 
evenhandedness, nor does it diminish other private actors’ opportunities to 
successfully deal with the government. 
Things become different when a memorabilia gift goes off market (and thus 
stops being a pure memorabilia gift). For example, if the chief of police were to 
receive from a baseball stadium owner Mark McGwire’s seventieth home run 
ball,52 he would likely be taking a bribe or unlawful gratuity. The reason is 
simple: Such memorabilia items are expensive, exclusive, and consequently are 
never given for free on the open market. By the same token, an IRS official will 
do well to decline a lunch invitation from an accounting firm after seeing 
Petrossian Kaluga caviar on the menu.53 
IV 
THE ECONOMIC ILLOGIC OF SKILLING 
A. McNally’s Legacy 
Sun-Diamond’s nexus requirement excessively narrowed the scope of the 
“unlawful gratuity” prohibition. This narrow interpretation of section 
201(c)(1)(A) is socially undesirable,54 but the Sun-Diamond Justices had a 
different opinion. Based on that opinion, the Justices interpreted the definition 
of bribery—an offense more serious than unlawful gratuity55—by interposing a 
 
 52.  See Jay Nolan, Is a Home Run Baseball Worth Millions of Dollars?, NAT’L EXAMINER, May 
11, 2010, available at http://www.examiner.com/sports-memorabilia-in-national/is-a-home-run-baseball-
worth-millions-of-dollars? (reporting auction purchase of Mark McGwire’s seventieth and final home-
run ball for $3,000,000). 
 53.  See PETROSSIAN, http://www.petrossian.com/caviar-1-kaluga-caviar-605.html (last visited Nov. 
17, 2011) (pricing 50g Kaluga caviar at $481). 
 54.  See discussion, supra Part II. 
 55.  For the definition of bribery as to the giver, see section 201(b)(1), and as to the recipient, see 
section 201(b)(2). Bribery is punishable by imprisonment for up to fifteen years, as well as by fine and 
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similar nexus requirement. Justice Scalia, writing on behalf of the unanimous 
Court, underscored that the key element of the bribery offense is quid pro quo: 
a “specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an 
official act.”56 More precisely, as he went on to explain, “Bribery requires intent 
‘to influence’ an official act or ‘to be influenced’ in an official act.”57 Under 
general evidence law, the prosecution must establish the presence of this 
specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt.58 Failure to do so will lead to the 
defendant’s acquittal.59 
The narrow scope of the two core corruption offenses has left a wide variety 
of corrupt activities underdeterred. Under Sun-Diamond, when a public official 
receives a gift, the gift will only be criminal if it was given or received as a 
reward for the official’s specific action. Favoritism fueled by gifts falls outside 
the scope of criminal corruption, although it will normally violate one of the 
criminal or administrative rules prohibiting public officials from positioning 
themselves in a conflict of interests.60 Conflicts of interests, however, are not 
punishable as severely as bribery and unlawful gratuity and are also not as 
stigmatizing as these two offenses.61 Furthermore, in most instances, the only 
party responsible for such misconduct is the official who receives the gift, but 
not the gift’s private giver. 
McNally v. United States62 gave the Supreme Court an early opportunity to 
eliminate the deterrence shortfall resulting from the narrow understanding of 
bribery and unlawful gratuity. In McNally, the Court took upon itself to 
delineate the scope of the federal mail-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 
proscribing the use of mail to carry out “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or 
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises.”63 This broad prohibition could be interpreted as 
proscribing all forms of corruption in the public service falling outside the scope 
of core bribery offenses. Indeed, the attorneys who argued the case on behalf of 
the United States asked the Court to interpret section 1341 in this way.64 
The set of facts upon which the Court decided the case was particularly 
suitable for that purpose. A senior public official in Kentucky was paid 
commissions (through companies he owned) for securing the payer’s business as 
a provider of insurance services under the state’s workman-compensation 
 
various disqualifications. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). For the definition of unlawful gratuity as to the 
giver, see section 201(c)(1)(A), and as to the recipient, see section 201(c)(1)(B). Unlawful gratuity is 
punishable by imprisonment for up to two years and a fine. Id. § 201(c).  
 56.  United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999). 
 57.  Id. at 404. 
 58.  See STEIN, supra note 44, at 172–83.  
 59.  Id. 
 60.  For a more or less comprehensive list of these rules, see Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 409–11.  
 61.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (2006) and 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202 (2011) (categorizing gifts received by 
public officials under certain circumstances as ethical, rather than criminal, violations).  
 62.  McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
 64.  McNally, 483 U.S. at 352. 
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program. Based on these facts, the official and his two accomplices were 
accused of devising a scheme to deprive Kentucky’s citizens and government of 
their “intangible rights” to have the state’s affairs conducted honestly.65 This 
scheme yielded the parties a handsome profit. Yet, as the Court noted, the State 
did not suffer much as a result of this fraudulent scheme. It was deprived only 
of its intangible right to receive honest services from its official. And, as the 
Court clarified, no accusation was made that “in the absence of the alleged 
scheme the [State] would have paid a lower premium or secured better 
insurance.”66 
The Court’s assumption of the scheme’s “Pareto-superiority” was patently 
false. The insurer found it profitable to earn the premiums that appeared in its 
policies while paying the State’s official $X to secure this transaction. Hence, in 
a face-to-face bargain with the State, the insurer would certainly have agreed to 
reduce the premiums by up to $X. The State was, therefore, fraudulently 
deprived not only of its official’s honest services, but also of the money—or 
some of the money—the official pocketed as a “commission.” From an 
economic standpoint, this “commission” amounted to a theft. It did not come at 
the insurer’s expense, but rather at the expense of the State. Importantly, this 
economic assessment is not confined to the facts of McNally. Rather, it will hold 
true in every case featuring an official’s self-enrichment. Such self-enrichment 
schemes always come at the expense of the government the official is obligated 
to serve. 
The assumption that the State suffered no pecuniary damage from the 
official’s self-enrichment scheme made it easy for the Court to decide that the 
scheme is “not within the reach of § 1341.”67 Far from trivializing the State’s 
intangible damage,68 the Court held that the criminal prohibition of mail fraud 
does not guard against this type of harm.69 According to the Court, if Congress 
really desired to protect the government from this type of harm, it should say so 
explicitly.70 
B. Skilling 
After thinking for about a year, Congress decided to speak explicitly: It 
enacted section 1346—a provision criminalizing any “scheme or artifice to 
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”71 This broad 
formulation makes section 1346 a supplement to the core bribery and unlawful 
gratuity offenses—a residual rule that penalizes corruptions not captured by 
 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 360. 
 67.  Id. at 361. 
 68.  Cf. Lisa Kern Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1815, 
1836–46 (2011) (rationalizing criminal prohibitions of corruption as fending off harm to the integrity of 
political process and the body politic). 
 69.  McNally, 483 U.S. at 359–61. 
 70.  Id. at 359–60. 
 71.  18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006). 
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those offenses’ definitions. This residual applicability is what Congress 
attempted to accomplish. 
Alas, this legislative attempt has failed. In Skilling v. United States,72 the 
Supreme Court decided that section 1346 needed to undergo comprehensive 
redrafting, guided by the lenity rule.73 Under this rule, when a criminal statute 
has two or more plausible meanings, courts should interpret it by adopting the 
meaning that favors the defendant’s case.74 
The lenity rule was not the only ground for the Court’s decision. The Court 
also relied on the “void for vagueness” doctrine.75 This constitutional doctrine 
invalidates criminal statutes that are open to multiple interpretations and 
consequently force people to guess what the law means to prohibit (while 
allowing the government to prosecute individuals almost at will).76 Based on this 
doctrine, the Court made an assessment that the unedited definition of honest-
services fraud is unconstitutionally vague.77 This assessment prompted the Court 
to find out whether the new offense can be disambiguated instead of being 
voided. Based on this innovative78 principle of “statutory survival,” the Court 
used the lenity rule to narrow the scope of section 1346. Specifically, the Court 
interpreted the honest-services fraud offense as prohibiting bribery and 
kickback payments, and nothing else.79 This interpretation rested on the Court’s 
assumption that Congress’s only goal in legislating section 1346 was to overturn 
McNally—a case in which the defendants managed to escape conviction 
notwithstanding the presence of a kickback payment. 
This narrow interpretation of section 1346 prompted the Court to invalidate 
the convictions of three petitioners (in separate cases). The first petitioner was 
Enron’s former CEO, Jeffrey Skilling, who participated in an elaborate scheme 
to prop up Enron’s stock price while hiding its financial losses. The Court held 
that Skilling’s participation in that scheme did not constitute honest-services 
fraud in and of itself. Skilling could only be convicted of that offense upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he received a bribe or a kickback payment for 
his part in the scheme.80 The Court remanded Skilling’s case for determination 
whether the honest-services fraud instruction of the jury was a harmless error.81 
The defendants in two other cases, Conrad Black and Bruce Weyhrauch, have 
 
 72.  130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
 73.  Id. at 2932–33. 
 74.  Id. at 2933–34. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 2933–34. 
 78.  Justice Scalia properly criticizes this innovation by attesting that “in transforming the 
prohibition of ‘honest-services fraud’ into a prohibition of ‘bribery and kick-backs’ [the Court] is 
wielding a power we long ago abjured: the power to define new federal crimes.” Id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). 
 79.  Id. at 2933–35.  
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 2935. 
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been equally successful. The Court vacated their honest-services fraud 
convictions as well.82 
The Skilling decision has created a setback for prosecutions of corruptions 
occurring in the public service. Such prosecutions can now only be successful 
against defendants who committed bribery or unlawful-gratuity offenses, as 
defined in Sun-Diamond.83 
The aftermath of the Skilling decision was equally disappointing. Consider 
United States v. Riley,84 a case in which the Third Circuit invalidated the 
conviction of Newark’s former Mayor and his girlfriend. Evidence upon which 
the jury found the two defendants guilty of violating section 1346 demonstrated 
that the Mayor used his control over the city’s redevelopment plan to secure the 
girlfriend’s discounted acquisition of city-owned properties. The girlfriend had 
no experience in property development; and so, instead of developing the 
properties, she sold them at a profit.85 The Third Circuit decided that this 
evidence did not warrant conviction under section 1346 because it did not 
establish that the Mayor received a kickback or a bribe.86 
This example is by no means unique. In United States v. Coniglio,87 the Third 
Circuit addressed the implications of the Skilling decision on the conviction of a 
former New Jersey state senator who had entered into a “consulting 
agreement” with a medical center. The agreement masked the center’s 
undertaking to remunerate him for improper official actions that benefited the 
center financially. After a three-week trial, the court instructed the jury to find 
the defendant guilty of honest-services fraud if it determined that he took a 
bribe or, alternatively, that he acted as a senator under a concealed conflict of 
interests.88 The Third Circuit decided that the “conflict of interests” instruction 
did not align with Skilling because it omitted the “bribe or kickback” element. 
This omission led jurors to form the wrong belief that the defendant’s conflict of 
interests, without more, suffices for his conviction. The Third Circuit 
consequently had no choice but to overturn the conviction.89 
 
 82.  Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010); Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 
(2010) (per curiam); see also HARVARD L. REV. ASS’N, The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 179, 360–70 (2010) (discussing Skilling, Black, and Weyhrauch and explaining the 
outcome of these decisions as the Court’s reaction to the prosecution’s overuse of its power). 
According to the survey’s authors, the prosecution in these cases charged conduct that only “debatably 
violate[d] the prohibiting statute.” Id. at 360. 
 83.  The honest-services fraud offense did not become completely redundant. See Skilling, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2934, n.45 (“Overlap with other federal statutes does not render § 1346 superfluous. The 
principal federal bribery statute, § 201, for example, generally applies only to federal public officials, so 
§ 1346’s application to state and local corruption and to private-sector fraud reaches misconduct that 
might otherwise go unpunished.”). 
 84.  621 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 85.  Id. at 319, 328. 
 86.  Id. at 339. 
 87.  417 Fed. App’x 146 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 88.  Id. at 148. 
 89.  Id. at 149–51. 
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The Skilling decision is flawed in a number of respects. First, section 1346 is 
not vague. This provision protects the right to honest services by criminalizing 
those who act fraudulently to deprive individuals of this right. Hence, in order 
to convict a person under this provision, the prosecution must establish the 
presence of a right to receive honest services and that right’s scope. After 
establishing these elements, the prosecution must prove that the defendant 
fraudulently violated or procured the violation of the right. In the private 
sector, this right is determined by contract. Within the framework of public 
service, this right is determined by a combination of contract, regulatory 
provisions, and general public law. If there is a serious doubt as to the right’s 
scope, or whether it existed in the first place, the court will have to acquit the 
defendant. The right to receive honest services does not differ in this regard 
from proprietary entitlements that criminal law protects against theft and other 
forms of embezzlement. 
The honest-services fraud offense is, indeed, very general. But being general 
is different from being vague. There is no constitutional bar against broad 
criminal prohibitions, as opposed to prohibitions that have multiple meanings. 
Nor should there be such a bar: Oftentimes, broad criminal prohibitions are the 
best way to fend off crime. Consider, for example, conspiracy “to defraud the 
United States . . . in any manner or for any purpose.”90 This offense is very 
broad and sufficiently clear at the same time. There can be no doubt about this 
offense’s constitutionality. As such, the broad definition of honest-services 
fraud, as designed by Congress, also aligns with the Constitution. 
On the operational level, the “off market benefit” criterion makes the 
prohibition of honest-services fraud easy to implement. In Skilling, the key 
question under this criterion would be whether the conspiracy to prop up 
Enron’s stock prices yielded an off-market benefit to any of the parties. The 
answer to this question is an unequivocal yes: The whole purpose of the Enron 
conspiracy was to allow the conspirators to generate profits that the market 
would have denied.91 
In McNally, the presence of an off-market benefit was equally apparent. 
The insurer obtained a profitable contract with the state by bypassing market 
competition. This contract constituted an off-market benefit. The official who 
secured this contract and helped the insurer bypass the market received a 
commission. This commission amounted to an off-market benefit as well 
because the official would not have received it on the open market. 
By the same logic, both the Riley and Coniglio cases featured an off-market 
benefit. The transactions that took place in these cases are not available on the 
open market. Consequently, parties to those transactions were guilty of honest-
services fraud. Moreover, these actors were guilty of bribery as well because the 
 
 90.  18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006). 
 91.  Ultimately, Skilling’s convictions were upheld by the Fifth Circuit on remand, after the court 
decided that the honest-services fraud instruction the jurors had received was a “harmless error.” 
United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 488 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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off-market benefits they accrued through those transactions were two-sided. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
My proposed criterion for identifying bribery and unlawful gratuity—
accrual of an off-market benefit by both sides to the suspected deal—is 
preferable to the Supreme Court’s “specific act” requirement. This criterion 
captures all variants of bribery without leaving off anything. Under this 
criterion, courts will abandon noisy signals, coming from the parties’ and other 
witnesses’ narratives, and will base their decisions on the economics of the 
suspected deal. When these economics reveal the presence of a two-sided off-
market benefit, this benefit cannot be accidental. Under such circumstances, the 
parties clearly intend to give and receive a bribe or unlawful gratuity. On the 
other hand, absence of a two-sided off-market benefit will show that the parties’ 
transaction involved no bribery or unlawful gratuity. For purposes of the 
honest-services fraud offense, the off-market benefit criterion will be very 
helpful as well. Under the definition of the offense, however, the off-market 
benefit can be accrued by any party to the fraudulent scheme. The prosecution, 
in other words, will only need to show that one of the parties fraudulently 
generated an off-market benefit for himself at the victim’s expense. In a typical 
case, of course, this party will share the benefit with other participants in the 
fraudulent scheme. 
 
